Zac Montgomery: Hey guys, my name is Zach Montgomery, and this is this week's episode of Built by Liquidation. We are a resellers podcast geared towards helping resellers not only grow their resale business, but also look a little bit towards the future and how to get out of that resale business, investing your profits in avenues that generate recurring income. On this week's episode, we are talking whatnot, specifically my experience with whatnot. ⁓ my opinion on the app and why ultimately it did not work for us, but how it could possibly work to grow your business. ⁓ so we're gonna get into it right away and we're gonna talk about when we got started, how we got started, the product we used to get started, how we grew our channel to an ultimately somewhere around fifteen thousand followers, nothing huge. But we did that in s in a very short window. We're also gonna talk about, you know The challenges that we faced, how we scaled quickly, why we ultimately chose to get off the app, but why I do think it is a very big benefit to a lot of resellers out there. So ⁓ let's start from the beginning. I was I pulled up my my app just to see when we actually started. ⁓ so we we ran whatnot last year. We started March, middle of March, we ran towards it looks like the End-ish of May. and so let's just we'll start from the beginning. So our first looks like two weeks and whatnot, we ran approximately twenty-eight thousand dollars in top line revenue. We started our so back up a little bit. Ton of liquidation companies got into into whatnot over the last couple of years and it's just really exploded. ⁓ with with liquidators and resellers, it's always been resellers, but really exploded with liquidators. ⁓ so we jumped on the bandwagon last March and my initial kind of thought of how to use the app and I've seen a lot of people do it was just random palette pulls and we took random literally. So our we took coffin boxes. If you don't know what a coffin box is, it's just it's a large box from Amazon, similar to a mystery box, just bigger, and we dropped the palette and we pulled items out one at a time, literally random. ⁓ from the from the box. And my initial goal was to be able to run about a hundred items per hour, run a three hour show. ⁓ that should have been roughly a pallet and a half worth of product. We right away it looked like we were gonna run about a five dollar per unit average on a cost of about a dollar fifty, which sounds phenomenal. ⁓ what we've quickly figured out was number one The average was skewed very heavily. So you'd have a ton of stuff that just flat out didn't sell. So we had a lot of leftover product. A lot of our a lot of our numbers were coming from a few items. ⁓ and then the rest were selling a lot of one and two and three dollar stuff. So we'd have, you know, items that of three hundred items that we'd sell, we'd have, you know, ten or twenty that would sell for fifty plus. The rest would sell between one and three that we'd have a lot of stuff that just didn't sell. at all. And we weren't really hitting our our number of 300. While we ended up stopping the the random pulls, ⁓ we were shipping a lot of product for one and three dollars. So obviously on what not the buyer pays for shipping. We were not doing free shipping, but when you sit there and you do the math on a dollar or even a two dollar item after transaction fees, you're left with between 40 and 60 cents on a dollar sale, double that for a two dollar sale, right? So We're spending the time and the labor shipping a lot of product that we're actually netting out, gross netting out 60 cents cost of material to ship it. Cause even though we'd get a lot of free pro a lot of free shipping material, you're still paying for a lot of it. There's no way to get, you know, everything you need for free. And then you're, you're paying labor, you know. So after about a week of or two weeks probably of doing the the math on that, it just really didn't pay to have someone else do it. Because a lot of the, like I said, a lot of the top line gross was coming from a few items. We're packing and shipping hundreds of items a a day in that one to three dollar. And then we still had a leftover. We still have to figure out what to do with that leftover product, which is just piling up at that point. So overall it was an encouraging start. But we found out that we would have to do a pre-sort to go through and get the stuff that we knew would sell well for above fifty. And then we would have to then come up with a system to sell the stuff that wasn't selling. And so we did what most liquidators do in that in that situation. We we started a processing center essentially, right? Processing two loads a week of raw LPN product, taking anything that retailed $80 and up and processed out everything else, and we sold that to bin stores. So now in order to get the product for whatnot, I had to hire two additional people to process the raw load. And now I was responsible for selling two processed loads a week. So in order to get the product I needed for whatnot to work properly, we now had to we had to have some more steps in place. So whatever, that's fine. We did that. But where that left us was not enough product to run our shows. Because again, we're only pulling the eighty dollar and up product, which on most of those trucks was a couple hundred pieces per truck. You know, I wanted to run in order to pay for a a new building, even though we own the building, in order to pay for that space, we would have to run three shows a day, three days a week. So the top line product of that wasn't enough. So we had to bring in additional product. And so we're having to go to someone else who's processing their loads and buy their top end product from them. So we went with Target Electronics, which were tested and working, and we went with ⁓ Amazon Electronics, which had a value of about the same of what we're doing, eighty dollars and up. Amazon high end. I think it started out as electronics, but it really it you know, it's more Amazon quote high end goods. So that's the next step that we went to. Now into our credit, we quickly scaled that. We went from two weeks selling, you know, the lower end stuff and then we jumped up so the first two weeks we sold thirty thousand dollars with the product. The next two weeks we did sixty five thousand five hundred dollars of product. The next two weeks after that We did another sixty-six thousand dollars in product. So we quickly scaled this ⁓ to sixty, you know, a hundred and twenty thousand dollars a month if you you know if you average that out. The issue and the challenges that we got to is so we're processing some of the product ourselves, which is already kind of an issue because you have to bring in the additional staff. Now we're in the space, and I gotta sell it, or somebody on my team has to sell the product. So we have to keep that. That process load has to be a quality load. So we don't have an issue selling it every week, but that's still capital tied up over there until we sell it. Now we've brought in Target, we've brought in electronic. So what do we do on the testing side? Because now you're talking about testing a thousand. We'll do the math, right? We want to run three ⁓ two hundred and fifty items per show, which is seven hundred and fifty items per day times three days a week. It's twenty five hundred. Hundred items a week is what we were selling. Right. And the goal was really to be at 300, but realistically we got to 2500. So what was the challenge in testing 2,500 items per week? Is it feasible to test that? Because the average person can cleanly test about 15 items per hour, depending on what that is. You know, it takes a lot longer to test. a computer than it does a blender. So you're looking at the cost of that if we were to test it was a dollar an item minimum or twenty five hundred dollars additional a week, but it's also staffing that because to staff that $2,500 divided by 15 items per hour you need six 166 man hours divided by eight hours in a day. That's 21 days. Right, you only have six of them in a week or five of them in a week, so you needed four additional staff members to get that number. So we made the decision that it wasn't worth testing and checking all the items. We would just take returns if there was any issues. We didn't ⁓ there was no questions asked policy. We would just take the return, which causes more issues, right? So how returns work on whatnot, at least when we were on the app, is The customer couldn't just return us the product. They had to go through Whatnot to return us the product. And then w a l more times than not, Whatnot just kept the product refund of the the buyer. So we were left without product coming back and without cash. Which is fine. We don't if the item doesn't work, we don't want the item back. But it would also ding our account, leave us a negative. So what we would try to do, and this is probably outside of the the terms of the app, is your item doesn't work, send us a message. We will just credit your account. We can issue credits. ⁓ we found out how to do that through the app. So buy something else from us, we'll just credit your account. ⁓ and that worked for a little while. But the issue is it's the numbers. How do you calculate the numbers? So we're running, you know, $120,000 a month, but how do you also calculate how much product doesn't work? Because we're selling 2,500 items a week. ⁓ it's customer service on the app because you're selling 2500 pieces, even if everybody, you know, we have a lot of recurring customers, but there's still hundreds of different people you're you're selling to every single week. So it's customer service. You're having people ⁓ at that scale, you're having so many people message you, where's my stuff? When are you shipping out my stuff? We had a two-day shipping policy. We we couldn't get any faster than that, and we'll talk about the challenges with with shipping in a second. ⁓ but It quickly became a staffing problem. How much staff do you need? Because again, we're running three shows a day. So you need three different showrunners three days a week. So you need three different people to run shows because as as funny as it seems, running a show for three hours is difficult. Like it's keeping up with that ⁓ your pep and your step, your attitude. ⁓ you have to be engaging with your customer. Every single ⁓ you know, for three hours it's moving 'cause we're moving product. ⁓ and I'll talk about the systems that we developed ⁓ in a second. So we're talking about the challenges with with staffing right this second. Let me write that down. So here's where I'm at. In order to sell twenty five hundred units of product a week right this second, right? We're ⁓ we're having to process our own stuff, right, to get some of it. I'm having to buy outright at I think 12% Target electronics and I'm having to buy Amazon electronics at 25%, 20% 20% of retail. ⁓ so not only do I have to to have the staff to process the truck to build the process trucks for my wholesale team, we then have to Have three additional show runners because those people can do one show per day, a morning show, an afternoon show, and an evening show. So that's three staff members for that. Two staff members to process loads, and those two loads will take all week to process. We debated on testing. We we we tried it, it didn't work. We moved on, but we still have to ship. How many people do you need to ship three shows a day? Because you're shipping almost a thousand items a day, and that's That's the next problem, right? So we quickly found out every which way not to run these shows and ship these shows. ⁓ so before I I I guess we'll we'll talk about how many people we ended up having, which I think was we had six shippers. ⁓ because we're shipping remember a thousand show a thousand items a day is what we were selling. And we had a day between shows. So we would run the show in the morning. After that morning show, our our first round of shippers would come in to then pack and ship that show. And then by our goal was by the time the second show of the afternoon was done, the first show was was boxed up, packed up, and so the shippers could then ship the second show before leaving and ship the late night show the following morning that we weren't that we weren't open. So we had shippers five days a week. Even though we only had shows three days a week, because Monday's show would ship half Monday, half Tuesday, and Wednesday's show would ship half Thursday, half Friday, and then Friday's show would ship half Friday, and then either Saturday, or you'd have to come in on Monday, which would then, you know, potentially push your whole week back. So, ⁓ let's talk about our systems, because now we're up to like I said, we're up to six, nine, ten, eleven, we're up to eleven staff members right now, is what we had to run. Three shows a week. Now, to be fair, those 11 staff, it was probably closer to nine or ten because some of the some of it six, seven, some of it was interchangeable. so I don't think we ever had eleven staff members on at one time for whatnot, but it was definitely between nine, about nine minimum that would have to work. So how do you Organize a thousand items a day, not only to be sold but to be shipped out. And this is where I think a lot of people struggle. And it's where we struggle to be honest. We we struggled to come up with a clean enough system that was so dummy proof that anybody could do it. Because unfortunately, I don't know if anybody else has this issue, but our issue is staffing. It's finding people that that wanna work, not only want to work, but want to care enough to follow a system. Because we and that's where we s we spent so many, so many nights and days as a you know as our upper management team designing ways to make it foolproof. And I mean that, you know, in the nicest way, but we you have to make it idiot proof. So we finally came up with a bucket system was our best, was our best way to go. So essentially, and I can draw this out and you know, maybe I don't know, if you're watching this on Spotify, I'll try to describe it. ⁓ but essentially we would have in the about a 10 by 10 space in the middle would be a table and that's where we would showcase the items, a banner behind us, and then we would pre-fill bins. So imagine, you know, the you know, the the black totes, but we'd have shelves that would fit about 30 bins per shelf, and that was our show. So we would pre-fill the bins one through ten, about ten items could fit in the bin sometimes. More sometimes less, but we kept it at 10 so it'd be equal. So we pre-numbered every item before ⁓ before going on, which was another task for these people. So all the prep work is what's important, but all the prep work also takes away from the profits, and that's what you know we'll get into it as we go. But back to our setup. In the middle, we had a table, and that's what you know, we we'd put the item on the table, showcase the item. Now if I'm facing the camera, to my immediate left would be the bin it could be getting this backwards, but whatever. To my left was a b was a rack of bins. Now it rolled, and that's important. You know, in the beginning it didn't roll. We quickly adjusted it needed to roll, and I'll tell you why. But we had thirty bins, ten items per bin, three hundred items. Really easy math. And then on the right side was the same rack that could fit thirty bins, but it was it was empty. So we Pull the first bin, one through ten, you'd set it on the table, boom, sell the item, move on. Boom, sell the item, move on. And then once that bin had sold through, I'd take that n tote that I just emptied, I'd have it refilled, I'd set it back into the empty bin, that would slowly fill up. So what would happen is one bin would be full, or one shelf would be full, one rack would be full, and by the end of the show, it would have swapped. And then what was super cool is that bin rolled right into shipping where the shipping team could then easily find the items that had sold based on their label. Cause that would be the most the second most time consuming aspect of this whole thing is locating your items. So the way whatnot works is depending on how you do it, right, is you can have the t you'd have the title, the description of the item and that's what's on the customer's receipt or their pull ticket, right? So if you're if you describe your item I'm having to show people having to teach people to look for you know Arctic Air Ultra Cooler. Go find that. Or what we did is we item number X and then did the title. So they should be looking for the number and then verifying the description next to the number. And so it's kind of a double check system. So goes into the shipping, they look. Okay, well, Bobby got two, three, and six. Number two was an ultra air cooler, number three was a Duke Canon deodorant. Number six was a microphone. Awesome. Those numbers match up. That looks like that's what it is. They can pack the order. And that should have been a super foolproof way of doing that. And unfortunately, somehow it still wasn't. Items were w you know, I don't know how, but items were winding up in the wrong boxes. Customers were getting the wrong shipments. And it, you know, it's a possibility because we were running so many shows in a single day that you know, show one was getting confused with show two. So, you know, hindsight's always twenty twenty looking back and said it if we wanted to do six shows a week, I should have done six shows, one show per day. And I think that would have been a little bit more of a cleaner a cleaner way of doing that. So, you know, would I go back to it? I still wouldn't, but not for not just for those reasons. So that was our system You would shipping would get the items. Now what we did, and this ⁓ this might be valuable to somebody, is the person who pulled the order did not pack the order. In theory. They weren't supposed to. So we had one puller or we had teams of two, right? So three teams of two. One person goes and pulls the order, one person packs the order. And that way there's two people that should be double checking that, right? It's about it's about a system of double checks. And In theory, if the person who pulls it d checks it, the person who packs it checks it, if there's any discrepancy, somebody should have caught that. And, you know, it's one of those you just gotta find the right people. And we were scaling so quickly that I don't think we found the right people in the in the moment. And we just we we accepted that, you know, that what's the word that I'm looking for? Mediocrity, which I think a lot of us ha like end up doing in positions like that, where it's You know, it's a $15 an hour position. We accept the mediocrity because you know, I don't know about anybody else, but when we try to hire, it it it it it sucks because we we typically hire because they showed up, right? We we called 10 people, we schedule interviews for 10 people. Of those ten people, two show up. Guys, we needed five. We needed five people to hire. We're gonna have to take those two that showed up because they showed up. ⁓ so my takeaway from that is we gotta stop accepting mediocrity. I think it bec it's ⁓ we accept mediocrity because we don't Feel like we have time to spend to go after better talent. And that's something that we us for sure, we have we do we have started to do better at. We we fire quickly. If you're not down for the team, just move on. We don't need people I can teach you the job, I can teach you how to do it, how to do it more efficiently, but I can't teach you to care. And I don't need you to care after five o'clock, you know. I need you to care from the hours of nine to five when I'm paying you. If I'm paying you a hundred percent of your paycheck, I need a hundred percent of your effort to come to work. That's all I'm asking for. ⁓ so we've talked about our system. We've talked about the shipping, which you know, the shipping, another issue that we ran into. I think a lot of people is it's the shipping USPS, it's shipping the post office. You know, our the center that we ⁓ all of our product goes to is in Fairburn, George, Georgia, and it's made national news several times for how crappy of a job they do. They lost so many packages. We we had at least two shows that got completely lost, never found, never reimbursed, because they never got scanned. S be so this is something I think people should understand is at the level that we're shipping, we couldn't take it to the post office. They stopped accepting our ⁓ drop offs because of how much we were shipping. The the post office in town just couldn't handle the volume. And so they would send the post office on a big semi to pick our stuff up. Well the issue was they wouldn't scan the packages individually because there's you know a thousand packages. They wouldn't scan them. And so we'd give them a scan sheet. They would scan the scan sheet, but you you get got on this part, right? Because the scan sheet only helps you maintain your shipping, right? So you get you get credited from whatnot for being on time if they scan your scan sheet, but you're not protected on lost packages until your package gets scanned. And that happens at the center. So if your product gets lost between the pickup and the center, you're screwed. Nothing happens for you. So we we you know thousands and thousands of dollars lost in that. So We've talked about our staffing, sh shipping, we've talked about the systems that we use in order to get all of this done. now I want to sit down well, let me do the last thing we pivoted to, and then I'll sit down, I'll break down all the numbers. So we our goal, obviously everybody's goal is as much capital, as much cash as possible to get run through. Now the issue with the product that we're selling is it's not it's profitable but it's not as profitable as you would think. The and this this could also be because of our business, right? So our business and how we ran on whatnot was war on retail. We're a liquidation company and for the last 15 years or so I've sold resellers. My business is geared towards selling to resellers so that they can make money and they can turn a profit. So most of our buyers Most of the buyers on the app in general are already, I feel like, resellers, but even more so, our our clients were resellers. So we didn't have as many of those items going for, you know, retail pricing. Our average 35%. 32-35% was our average recovery of retail. So you can imagine trying to buy. for that is tough, especially when you start adding in the returns, adding in labor. It's extremely the margins are extremely thin, but the volume is what's supposed to make up for that. And we'll break down the numbers at the end. But ⁓ so our we've pivoted in the last year or so, war on retail has, to closeouts, ⁓ closeout deals. We we work with a lot of brands and companies going out of business and we liquidate for them. And so what that gives us Is a high volume of single SKU deals. And what that means is I've got an ultra air cooler that this camera's propped up on. I had 5,000 of them. Now, the best way for me to make as much money as I can on that deal is to sell it to the end consumer, you know, like a whatnot channel. So on whatnot or in a retail setting, discount retail setting, I should get ten to twelve dollars a unit for that item. When I wholesale it the way I do now, I get only three to four dollars. So obviously selling through a channel like whatnot is way more profitable. The issue is how many of those ultra air coolers can I sell? And this is what ultimately led to us, you know, walking away from the app is I couldn't sell enough. You know, I could sell ten of those coolers per show before people stopped buying them altogether. And when you have five thousand, you can only sell thirty a day. It would take you five thousand divided by thirty. It would take you a hundred and sixty-six shows. And we're doing three hundred and sixty-six days worth of shows and we're doing, you know, you're getting three of those a week. It would take you f 166 divided by three. It would take you a solid year to sell that deal. And That's if you could maintain the number. So that was really my final like kind of nail in the coffin was I couldn't move enough of what I needed to move to make it work. I didn't have enough closeouts to where I could have just straight shows of closeouts. So in order to move the closeouts, everything else had to fall in place. I had to process the product, we had to source the electronics, we had to source the target, we had to sell and ship all these things. And then all I was doing this for was to move my closeouts. And I couldn't move enough of my closeouts to make a difference. And that's what, you know, inevitably led us to say, okay, this all of this isn't worth the juice isn't worth a squeeze at the end of the day. Cause what was the most profitable is the closeouts for us. We make our mark and we'll go into more details on videos in podcasts of our closeouts. But our closeouts are why we're still in the liquidation game. You know, the rest of it to me is played out. The margins suck. the closeouts we're making a shit ton money on. I can make a shit ton more if I can find a way to move my closeouts to the end user versus having to wholesale all of them. But whatnot was not the answer for that because even though the volume in general is great, it's not a good platform to move volume of a single skew unless you just have multiple channels and the issues just at scale become become large. So I'm gonna wrap this up by explaining one more time, you know, our challenges with the app and why we ultimately decided not to pursue it further. But then also I'm gonna give you a little bit of encouragement if you're debating on if you're thinking about doing the app and jumping on there or if you're already on the app, you know, I have encouragement for you, but for us, the biggest challenges were scale, you know. Anything I do today, I have to look at it of can I grow this to scale where it's worth my time? Because we've got a lot of a lot of projects, a lot of stuff going on where time is the most valuable thing that I have and I can't get it back. And if I'm gonna focus on something, I've gotta focus on what I get the most out of for that time. So I was spending, you know, in the moment, I was spending probably forty hours a week ⁓ on whatnot, whether that was, you know, selling myself, because you know, I I enjoy jumping on there, but whether I was selling or I was, you know, training to ship, sourcing the inventory, selling inventory that we had to process to get the product for whatnot, you know, dealing with returns, whatever it was, I was spending probably 30 or 40 hours a week on this app to generate a gross sales of, you know, a hundred grand a month, which by itself isn't a bad deal, right? A hundred grand a month in gross sales sounds like a lot. But when you sit there, we own the space, we own all of our warehouse space and that's you know, that's more content and more podcasts. But ⁓ I still have to charge myself a fair market rent for the space that I'm using because if I don't I could rent it to somebody else, right? So I have to pay myself rent. We had staff of eight people that I would say will You know, we'll say eight, we'll say six full time. ⁓ and then we'll say the other the other ⁓ we'll say nine, six full time, we'll say three part time. Either way, we're employing nine people for this one thing. you still have utilities, you still have stuff like forklifts, you still have the product costs themselves. So that hundred thousand, you know, we'll say We'll say that was thirty five percent of retail, right? So a hundred grand, I'm gonna do some terrible math here. What is that ⁓ is that six hundred thousand in retail, maybe? Four three hundred thousand in retail? Give or take, right? Just for easy numbers. We'll say it was three hundred thousand in in retail value, right? So my cost on that on average, we'll say was twenty well no, we'll say it's was sixteen percent because we bought the electronics at twenty. The target at a ten or eleven and then we had other. So we'll say what I say sixteen percent was our cost. So three hundred thousand at sixteen percent. Our cost on that hundred was forty eight thousand. So our gross profit before anything else is fifty two thousand. This number doesn't include returns, which I think we're at least 10%. So you then you gotta take away another $10,000. So we're at $42,000. You gotta take staff, nine people. We'll say an average of six hundred and fifty dollars a week times four. You're looking at twenty-three thousand dollars. We'll say twenty-two for round numbers, twenty-two thousand dollars and staffing costs, which leaves us with twenty thousand. Rent would have been five thousand. That's $15,000. And then there's some hidden stuff in that. So all of that to make $15,000 a month. Net profit, and that's probably generous. I can probably whittle that number down a little bit more when you when you start factoring in utilities, forklift, and everything else. So call it $10,000 a month. If I had nothing else going. That's not bad money, right? If I had nothing else going on, and this is the encouraging part for people, right? This is where I go, well, this is why I stopped was the juice wasn't worth the squeeze. Because I can't afford to spend 40 hours a week making $10,000 a month. Because I've got other aspects of my business that generate a shit ton more than that. That if I devote my time to those other things, it will generate more than $10,000 a month. So for me. it was not worth continuing on the whatnot path to figure it out to generate ten to fifteen thousand dollars in net profit a month when I could spend less time on something else to generate more. The positive for people that are listening to this that are like, well shit, why why would I do whatnot? By itself, it's not bad. It's a I mean, 10, I could have grown that to 20,000 a month. We could have made a quarter million dollars a year profit, take home, pre-tax on the app. Now, is that a lot of work? Yes. Do you need to be, in my opinion, you're probably gonna have to spend a lot of your own personal time to come up with the systems, to come up with the ⁓ to to train the staff to get it to that point to maintain that number? You're gonna have to be pretty involved. But it's a doable thing. I think that's the encouraging thing, is it is doable to clear quarter million dollars in profit, half million dollars in profit by selling through whatnot because of the volume that you can do. That is the benefit to the whatnot and to the live selling. It's the sheer volume of product that you can move. You have to buy the correctly, though. You have to buy low because you're not selling for high. At least in the liquidation space, it's it's it's blown up, it is oversaturated. And so you have to do good at sourcing, you have to do your homework, and you have to train your staff to be efficient. Efficiency, cost of goods, you know, low rent, you don't have to be anywhere that matters, right? You can do this out of your home, you can do this out of a warehouse space, you don't have to have a prime location if you want to do local pickup, you can. It doesn't have to be prime location for that. So keeping your overhead this is I mean it's it's sounds like common sense, but keeping your overhead as low as you possibly can. Don't skimp on paying your staff because those are the people that are gonna help you grow even bigger. We offered commission on our salespeople. We offered a bonus to our staff on shipping if they could go under a certain percentage of problems. So n not testing problems, but you know, we again we had packages showing up that were missing an item. And ⁓ come back we find it They didn't put it in a box. So we offered an incentive if you had under a certain percentage of issues on shipments going forward, we would bonus the shippers. So treat your staff well, offer incentives to do a good job, but you're gonna have to be laser focused if you wanna hit those kinds of numbers. And it's gonna be your it's gonna be your, I think, your full time job to keep that going because there's so many moving parts to whatnot into live selling to move that volume. But it's doable. And if you have any questions about our setup, I think our setup was a good one overall. I think our issue again was was finding staff members who cared and ⁓ and that's on us. You know, we can't accept mediocrity just because we don't have time to find more. So any questions about selling on the app, setting up your space to sell, sourcing goods to sell on whatnot, you know, I'm happy to To give my two cents for whatever it's worth. But that is pretty much a wrap on this week's episode of Built by Liquidation. I did not have a guest today, so I'm very curious to see your thoughts, comments, questions for my solo episode. See if I was boring to listen to for 35 minutes or not. But I appreciate anybody listening. If you have any questions for us, please reach out. Thank for watching. Tune in next week and Follow us across all platforms. Thanks.