Blaine J. Hoffmann: all right, ⁓ we talking about metrics ⁓ and I a little rant, I did little topic ⁓ and I kind of ranted about metrics ⁓ and I will admit it, I probably didn't articulate it well. ⁓ but it was a rant. What do you expect? And my whole thing was I've heard managers say this my entire career, that quote about, know, what gets counted gets controlled or what met, what gets measured gets managed. There's always some variation of it. And they use it to justify measuring every possible thing under the sun so that we can control it. Well, I got a couple of questions about that, but I started looking up like who the heck said that? Everyone says it was Stephen Covey, the day planner guru. Franklin Covey was the partnership, I think. But it wasn't, was VF Ridgeway back in, I think the 50s said, I think it was what gets measured gets managed even if we shouldn't be measuring it. It was a cautionary tale, meaning be careful what you. decide to measure because then that will become the work that you will then be focused on that thing. And it could be the wrong thing. And then I was reminded of the lean guru. ⁓ his name is escaping me now. ⁓ he said, ⁓ measure what matters, but know what matters first. And that sort of aligns with that. It was like, yeah. Yeah, if you start counting something, you'll be aware of it. And then people will go, ⁓ they're tracking this. Okay. So I'm going to do this. ⁓ but it shouldn't matter. It should be important. So I, I kind of come into this with, with that kind of foundation, but I want to, I want you to give me that reality check. Tell me I'm off base. ⁓ but I thought we could get into metrics. the good, bad, the good, bad, the ugly, the pros and cons, leading lag and like, where do we start? Let's start somewhere logical. What do you suggest? Alex: So ⁓ starting somewhere logical, I might start with what are even the value of metrics to people? To me, a lot of people think the purpose of metrics is to tell us reality and predict the future. So a lot of people look at metrics and they think it's going to predict the future for them. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Okay. Alex: You know, I think 90 % of business is trend line goes this way, bad trend line goes that way, good or whatever, depending on the measure. Right. So they think just because of a tri-strike trend line today, that that will continue tomorrow. So I think there's two sides to this that we want to measure. Why do we measure things and what is most important to actually give us predictors for the future and for what we care about. So I think it is important to measure and understand the facts of what happened. Being able to look at the state of things. There's a lot of, if we don't know if we were ahead or behind today, do we really know if we were successful? If we don't know, you know, whether this is sales or safety or operations, if we don't know the score at the end of the game, How do we know if we're doing well or not? So I think there definitely is something ⁓ as about forming a baseline that you have to do and have an understanding of the baseline. But I think that often gets inflated with understanding what control you have over that. So understanding what to measure and what control you have over the results of that measure ⁓ is a key thing. So I think that's maybe a good place to start is to say, what are we trying to measure? What is it that we control that affects that measure? Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah, I mean, because you could effectively, especially with technology today, or even just with a spreadsheet, you can measure all sorts of things. So I think that's a great question. wrote down, ⁓ what is the value of what we're measuring? What is it, what is it giving us? And that's, that's why I see value. What am I getting out of this? ⁓ and in business or let's say safety. I want to be able to determine one, are we focusing on the right things? Are we doing the right things? So you said two other things, facts of what happened. So if something didn't go right, according to our plan, right? Maybe it's our safety plan. Maybe it's we set up SOPs, maybe ⁓ we organize the workspace in a way that we thought was productive and ⁓ efficient and safe. something bad happened, what did we miss? Like if it was a good plan, why didn't it work? And so the facts of what happened and then the state of things, that's a good one. And we've talked in the past about audits and inspect, well, we inspect ⁓ things, we audit processes, right? I always start with that framework, but the state of things, if we set something up, Are we maintaining it? Is it controlling what we thought? How is it working? so audits and inspections kind of come into mind with that, giving us an idea of the state of things. And then you mentioned predicting the future. I thought leading indicators, predictive measures, like a lot of folks are like, lagging indicators suck. We need to be looking at leading indicators. And I'm like, well, maybe, but that doesn't mean the other ones suck. So let's talk about maybe those two categories because I know you have some thoughts on leading and lagging and what those might mean. Alex: So if I'm allowed to rant, I'm gonna rant for second, but I see a big debate right now on whether we even, if TRIR is even a good measure. And there's a lot of people debating on if it predicts anything, if it's valuable, ⁓ and the counter to it, the people that are mostly, I think the main ones against it, Blaine J. Hoffmann: Do it. Alex: are proposing a new measure. And I don't believe I have seen good evidence to say that that new measure is any less subjective, is not going to be gamified any more or less than the current system. And I don't think it's any more predictive. And so when I look at just debates about measures, what we should be measuring, I think that people miss the point. Most of the time management is trying to assess where we're at in order to make strategies for the future. A good data set allows you to make better and more informed decisions, but also people tie things like bonuses. They tie things like, ⁓ you know, pay increases and promotions to different measures. And so Most of what we're trying to do is we're trying to cover for these measures and instead of taking them as, okay, I want to collect as good quality of information as I can, erring on the side of problems. So what I mean by that is I don't cheat when it comes to TRIR. I'm not going to gain this. If someone got hurt, that's a bad thing. We want to have that. We're not going to play the game of is this truly a recordable or not. So let's measure it as the worst case. That's a good ethical thing to do as a leader. And it's probably the right mindset. It's also not going to get you promoted and it'll hurt your career. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yes. Man, I, I'll get, I'll do one worse for you. I'll pile onto your rant. ⁓ this is not a counter rant. This is a hell yeah. ⁓ piling on here. I want to know, see to me, I was trained and taught this way, if you will, that when somebody gets injured, that's what we want to know. That's the metric. When did this happen? One, because that also gives us context that we need when something or some things are taking place. Businesses, all businesses do some variation of this and it's frustrating. They will go with the day or they want to know what, when it was made recordable for the OSHA log. Well, How we gamify or say gamify how we manipulate this is according to the 1904, you know, standards, ⁓ the OSHA record keeping standards. The business has seven days from the day they, ⁓ they are aware or made aware that it meets one of the recordability criteria. Seven days to just write it on the log. Either a physical paper log ⁓ or put it in, like flip it in your system, your digital management system. ⁓ That it, this is a, we, we have a recordable injury illness on the log of injuries and illnesses, right? Seven days. So what businesses do is they set some, and nobody has ever given me an answer to this. Some arbitrary number of recordables that we feel comfortable with. Every week. If we have, so we'll say we only want to see, we don't want to see any more than three recordables a week in a given week. If there's more than three, we have a problem. So what the, what the sites do, what the managers do is they go, ⁓ man, we've got five recordables this week. Well, you know, the last two happened on, ⁓ you know, Wednesday and Friday. So what we'll do is we'll just push those into the next week. So we only record like Yeah, but they still happened in that week. What was going on in that week? You had a bunch of people, ⁓ know, you had attrition You had you just came out of layoffs and this is the thought the trailing week after layer Those are all important information. So if I'm tracking the days they're made of the week, they're made recordable. I'm losing some of that context. I don't give a crap. I don't care about that metric. I want to know when we're injuring people. I want to know when because I need to know what was going on at that time. And if you punt, it's just a first aid, right? We just took a first aid, a minor injury, right? And The site knows full well that they're at the doctor, there's paperwork coming back and I know exactly what's going to happen. Or I have paperwork and I'm sitting on it because I don't have to put it on the log until next week, until, you know, day six, right? The business says, ⁓ we just had a handful of first aides. All right, those are minor. Those are okay. Then we've reduced that risk profile in our processes to where it's just minor things. Anyway, that's just my piling on my rant of like that. Why do I care? The week we made it recordable. I want to know when we're injuring people. Alex: And that's one of the reasons why it's so hard to do things like statistical process control on safety metrics. So if you're trying to plot a upper and lower control limit and six sigma this, you're not, you're going to struggle with safety measures, partly because they get so gamified. Um, I had a, uh, one of the, one of the ways I got promoted once, uh, was because the guy that had had that job, uh, they had a. packout rate that they had to do every week, dollar amount, and they were fudging it, basically meaning they would record and scan something as if it was packed and they would catch it up the next week in the early part of the year. And so basically every week there was this pile of stuff that had to be packed out that was already said shipped. And they ran into a problem because they eventually got caught because something big got. Blaine J. Hoffmann: ⁓ Alex: in that pile and got detected. you know, gamifying measures misses, it's important for people, it's in the career. People get promotions based on measures, but it blinds you to understanding problems. And if you're hiding from problems, you're never going to solve. And just pushing that pile into next week doesn't solve the issue of why we couldn't do it this week and why things got missed. ⁓ and it just makes the, it's just covering up. So I think the first thing we want to say with any measures is we want them to be accurate and we don't want to be covering up problems. The next thing kind of ties into what you're saying. What you were asking originally, which is leading versus lagging. What's important. I think the reason why lagging indicators get a bad rat, get a, get a bad rep is because people treat them like they're predictive. And safety measures are really bad at that. Your injury rate is not necessarily predictive of even what you're doing today. You guys actually have been made huge improvements in your safety culture and in the activities that are going on and blocking off hazards and really being really proactive, but somebody's still getting injured because you probably haven't got it everywhere. You probably haven't covered every scenario. So again, there are sometimes people overreact. So I like to go think on this. One of my biggest examples that I tie back to was ⁓ basically there were peer audits. I won't call them behavior-based safety audits, but they were peer audits. We basically had a requirement. You had to have one a week. Everybody in the plant had to do one a week. And do you think those were done on Monday, Wednesday, or Friday? Blaine J. Hoffmann: Work will expand to fit the time allotted. I say it was the last day of the week they filled it out. Alex: You know, it always went that way. was like, if you had to do this many in a month, five were done at the last week. You know, it was that kind of thing. So, ⁓ I see a lot of people trying to push toward measures that are based on observations. And I think those are becoming more interesting as things like AI for analysis, for analyzing what comments people are putting in. I think they are getting more interesting, but I also. know that garbage in equals garbage out. And if your measures, if your incentives are driving people to completion, your quality is going to be bad. The purpose is going to be missed. And you're probably not going to get much, I would say real data, useful data out of it. That's why at the plant, we changed from a certain number every month to we stopped tracking that. We still tracked it, but we stopped like that being the measure. the measure started to beginning to number of significant findings. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yes. You, that's more of a qualitative metric versus a quantitative, is, did you do the five? Yes. Okay. Well, they all sucked, but that doesn't matter. I still get the grade. Yeah. Yeah. Alex: Yeah. I think it was a lot more work though. Yeah, so it was a lot more work and that's the person that has to record this now has a job of reading every single one of these, marking it some systematic way of if it's, you know, good, fine or bad, fine. And that had benefits. We tweaked it a little bit more to be more about ⁓ corrective action too. And those kinds of things make a difference. It changes again, the purpose of it. But I think when we're doing leading versus lagging, I don't know that we always set the right, we'll say parameter for what actually is leading. So like, I'll give an example. A popular new book right now, HowlWell has actually got it my desk right here. finished it, I was going through it again. But it's an energy safety book. And I'm not pimping his book. But it's a popular one. I'm sure you've seen it on LinkedIn and other places. They have a measure that they're trying to create for measuring the number of critical controls in place. And it's so subjective because in order to mark if something was a critical control or not, you have like six criteria it had to meet. And All I can think of is how am I going to realistically do this in a way that is actually predictive of a job that day? And I don't think some of these measures that are being recommended are ones that are actually providing a leading indicator that day. So I kind of go back to what I would call deer sign as a supervisor. If you're going hunting, You got to know if the deer is in the area. You're looking for signs. You're looking for poop and tracks and beds and all these different things. And I think a lot of things that what are better leading indicators are probably things that supervisors have to look for the day of. And it's signs of things. Maybe it's things like precursors, ⁓ air travel. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah, I think they're called there. I've heard them called weak signals precursor. It doesn't even have to be an event. It could just be conditions that are present that we haven't interacted with yet that we were like, okay, we've got to clear this up before we go in here. ⁓ Yeah. Alex: Yeah. But tracking that, and I've seen people try to track that, where they're like, how many precursors have we found today? And you're like, ⁓ is this the right? If we find them, we should solve them. Waiting on tracking them doesn't seem like it's the right, but. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah, I get it. I think it's an attempt. It's also an attempt. And I think you touched on it at the beginning where we conflate these things. It's also an attempt, which is valid, I think, an attempt to measure our efforts, how good we are at, you know, finding and fixing things. So, but what happens is with everything else in business, and I think it's just human nature. that we shift our focus from doing that job. The job should be, one, do we maintain presence on the floor? Two, do we have a process to evaluate? Certainly, we can get into CIFS, but certainly high risk operations of assessing those conditions prior to the work beginning to make sure, like, that's the work, are we doing the work? We aren't just observers. We're not spectators in some sport that's taking place that we have no effect or impact on. We're in the game. Like we're, we're not just watching and keeping score. And we are actually in, we have the ability to impact the score, the final score, the game. And I think it's an attempt of some of these ⁓ efforts are. Good faith attempt at measuring our, how good we are at the work, at doing the work. And then, but then it becomes distraction of, ⁓ I noticed these things. And then we start then pulling away from the work and managing the numbers. If that makes sense. Am I even way off base on this? Alex: Yeah, if we have too many metrics, that's what you're going to focus on. That's what your people are focused on. And do you really want them focused on number go up? Maybe you do, because there is some operational numbers that you have to get a certain degree. But you can only focus on so many things. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah, I mean... I I go back to this old, ⁓ man, what was that? It was called First Break All the Rules, that old Gallup ⁓ book. ⁓ I would recommend anybody go back to that book and read it. It's crazy. And I think they broke down to, that's where the 12 core questions, the Q12 or whatever, ⁓ 12 core questions came from that was very popular for a while. The first one for any worker, you could be a PhD with 40 years experience and you get hired in at a new company. You still have the same first question. ⁓ the first three, they did like base camp, like climbing a mountain, right? And there, there are sets of three questions and there's 12. You can't, you can't focus on the 10th, 11th and 12th question until you get these first sets of questions answered satisfactorily. And the first one is, do I know what's expected of me every day? That's it. So you say, you, you mentioned a worker like, yeah, production. I, we're here for a reason. This company makes widgets. I've got to produce so many widgets a day. That's I'm going to do that. I think where we can get a lot better as a safety, ⁓ industry safety profession is, is integrating successfully safety into that process. Meaning. You have to do this many, but we're going to train you on the how you do it. And safety is just a natural part of it. You cannot pick any pieces out of the how and to make this faster. I don't care if it's quality, safety, ⁓ or whatever, or cost, like it all has to be there and you'll get your, you'll get your rate at the end of the day. And if you can't, we'll have to figure that out. Yeah. Alex: And the measure has to make sense. It has to make sense with that because again, I've seen people been given certain run rates they have to follow and they're like, well, look, if I have to take the time to put on this fall protection or change off, this does affect my run rate that day. ⁓ So I do try and take shortcuts. We use an example. It was an old Toyota example of there was a person that was falling behind on Blaine J. Hoffmann: ⁓ yeah. Alex: They're basically installing seat belts and they have to install seat belts all day. And this person was, I think it was like, they were like six foot seven or six foot six or a big tall person. And they were having to reach down and get that seat belt and pull it up off the tool, the part rack, and then climb in the vehicle to install it. Well, you know, hitting that measure, they've got a certain amount of time to hit the next car. And they would fall behind a few, just because a big, big tall guy got to go all the way down. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah. Alex: My back started just thinking about it. And you know, over the course of a full shift, they would lose a couple seconds over that shift. And so they had to start, you know, changing what they do and changing the path and rushing and going faster. And if your measures are so tight that it doesn't allow for people to do it in a way that matches their body, or, or, or some of those kinds of like the safe way to do it. You can start to see them have to take shortcuts and start to see them have to break rules in order to keep pace. And that's when it's people end up getting injured or cause quality defects, whatever bad outcomes you want to go to prescribe to them. But that's where we start to see that kind of stuff is when, you know, we set up a system where people are going to fail and going to struggle. Blaine J. Hoffmann: So now we're getting into like metrics being a natural outcome of a design fallacy that we assume we designed something properly. Why are we still having these issues? And then we then try to manage the numbers on the backend when it's, I'm not saying we accept it, but we miss this reality that you just talked about. Ergonomics is a great example. We every workstation is the same height and we're like, well, we followed the industry standard for height. Well, that's based on the average. There's an average, ⁓ male worker, average female worker, height in, in weights. And when you show me that average worker, if you have a thousand workers, you might have two. Yeah. I don't know what the, can't remember. Somebody's going to roast me. I'm sure in the comments. Alex: You will be, you'll be average. You'll be average in one feature. There's no average person. And in fact, if you created your. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yes. Yeah, that's my point. Yeah. Age, height, gender, like it's, you can build something for the average and then none, none of your workers will meet that average. So then you're still going to have these on these edges or margins, these issues that pop. And you're like, well, I don't understand why we've designed everything. Well, like, yeah, but you. Everybody is different. So that's a great example of how we kind of miss We miss that that piece Alex: Yeah. And if you actually, if you take all of the features of a person and made them all average, you actually get a really goofy looking person because we've never, we have never seen an average person. You've never seen what they don't exist. So it's, it's, it's a little bit of the weird things. had, uh, I had two people that worked for me. One of them was six foot eight and the other was four foot 11. And they worked on the same piece of equipment. Blaine J. Hoffmann: That's a good point. Alex: Again, just the difference of people, you know, and they have to work and deal with those constraints and moving things and, you know, all sorts of different challenges arise. I just did a, I just did a video on our YouTube channel about mistakes by design and talking about designing for universal design. So when we think about things like, you know, a workspace design. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah. Alex: You know, you have to think about equitable use. And that doesn't mean that you do the average so that it works for no one. It's how do you make it flexible so that anyone can do the job and meet rate? And that's a very tricky thing to do. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yes. Yeah. When I used to ⁓ I Would I'm gonna say teach but I don't really like like that word coach. I don't know I would ⁓ Deliver a training topic to new Safety, you know coordinators that were they didn't have any formal training and safety management or anything. They're starting out right and we would cover inspections and audits and why there's a difference and There's a difference in how you approach them and all that good stuff. They asked me about, Hey, what do you do when workers are in this particular shop? They, the maintenance team and the machine operators, they had to do certain amount of routine maintenance. They would modify their tools and stuff. And they would say, Hey, our policy is you can't use shop made tools or you can't modify your tools. What do we do when we see those? We, write them down. And we turn them in, but like people still do it. And I said, that's because if, if they prevent them from doing that, they won't be able to do the job. I, so what I taught them, what I shared with them is to me, when you're modifying your workspace or your tools, it's because you don't, because it's not fitting your need in some way. Right. We, something as simple as a chair, they had a shop chair. And they had taken a foam off of an old chair that was damaged. They took the seat foam and cut strips off it and put it on the arm and taped it. And so they were like, look at this. Like we need to get them new chairs. go, no, that chair is fine. If they don't have enough padding, what they're saying is they do a lot of this resting their arms and it was hard. So they put padding. They're telling you what they need. Right. There, or if somebody has a stool. And they're like, Hey, you're not supposed to have a stool over here. What do you do? Well, maybe they're shorter and they can't reach that top shelf where other workers can. So they've, they've adapted. Those are all signs. Like they're telling us something and it doesn't mean we accept it. That might mean that we have to build that flexibility, which I love that word. That flexibility into the workspace or into what we, what we offer them for job aides. Those inspections are a great opportunity for us to kind of get ideas from workers too, as well. Alex: So my big rant on this whole thing, to tie it all back to where we started with metrics, I think we could have less metrics and more gimbal walks and we'd probably be better off and looking at ways of how do we make problems visible while walking on the shop floor or working in an industry. We'd be better off focusing on creating more of those and less metrics to measure. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Matrix. Alex: The other thing is if we really think about our measures, our measures, is there a way to be proactive and discover these problems before they exist in a proactive way? And that's the kind of thing we shouldn't be measuring, but we should be auditing to find and do less. I don't want to do proactive data recording. That's not going to be, again, leading indicator, recording too many leading indicators is probably, I'm not going to say it's a waste of time because I haven't seen the data enough to know, but I, my, my gut tells me it's just paperwork. It's more paperwork and it's not really telling you what you think it is because it's just going to gain. A better thing is to say, okay, we've got our reactive measures. We're going to, those keep our score and we have these proactive. actions that we're going to be committed to taking and looking for these signs and measure them or not. I don't know that it is necessary, but I think you really should have a really clear understanding of what people need to be looking for from a proactive standpoint and go out and do that. Track it or not. I don't know if it's worth it, but ⁓ I think we more value spent there than tracking another metric for someone to check off and send out every week probably is the best. Blaine J. Hoffmann: It's going to be more difficult to do. It's more work as you indicated earlier, but it, but it's more effective. Right. And I think people want efficient over effective or, or they think they're the same word and they're not sometimes the most efficient thing. Isn't the most effective thing. And sometimes the most effective thing may take a little more time or effort, which by some definitions would be less efficient, but it's, you know, it's on the backend, you're going to improve things a lot more. And I think the approach is, you're right, that we, get more local with, with what we're measuring at the site level. For example, if we had 12 improvement projects that changed layout or process design or, ⁓ acquired some additional tools or whatever, all those efforts. just kind of went down. talked about your audit would be, are those working? How are those looking three months, six months, 12 months later? Are they solving for what we thought? How, how effective were we at solving that problem? Did those ideas work? And that becomes your metric. Maybe it's recidivism rate. Right. Not, injuries, but how many of those projects did we have to go back and redo with because we missed some or it didn't work. But then again, I'm thinking, yeah, but you know, it's trial and error is that that's the thing with ideas is you could have an idea and then find out that you learn something new and ⁓ that's not going to work because of X, Y, Z. So we're going to pivot and do the, I don't even know how useful that is. I think. Alex: So. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Go ahead. Alex: I'll just say that we do this in two ways, because you have two different sides to this. You've got verification and validation. So verification would be, I verify that it was completed. know, whatever that project is, whatever it had to get done. Yeah, I have to get it done. So you have to a measure to when that, when you verify that it was done. Validation is a validation of effectiveness. And that is one of the hardest things for people to recognize. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yes. That's a pass mail, right? Check the box. Yeah. Yes. Alex: ⁓ there is a famous lean graph. comes from the Shingo prize Institute there and it applies to everything, but it's, basically, it's this little, has a stagnant line that kind of comes up and then it levels off and it has these areas. And sometimes it talks about where do we regress back to. And it came from there. Basically they have people that go for this prize and they look at the data and they say, okay, Some percent of people never get off the ground. They never make an improvement. Some percent of people see improvement, but they don't stick with it. But there's this group of people that, and it's only 15%, actually see sustained improvement in something. And the majority of, in their case, it was lean implementation. it was lean implementations fail after five years. They regress back to the mean after five years. Only 15 % keep that improvement and only 5 % of that 15 actually see continuous growth. And their point was that most things regressed back to the mean and being five years. Now, I think five years is an interesting number because if you think about how many times you've changed jobs in five years and how many new leaders come in and how many new people that started projects left. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah. Alex: Like five years actually has a lot of lost knowledge every five years. And so one of the things that I think people struggle with is how do they figure out validation for the next business leader, the next person coming in? We rarely do a good job of handoffs between leadership of, hey, these were the problems we were dealing with five years ago. Here's the actions we took to solve them. Don't break these. We don't do a very good job of that. And so. People have to figure out ways to create a process that validates corrective actions and doesn't overburden the system. Because again, ⁓ I'm going to audit this new corrective action. Well, I did 10 corrective actions every month. I've got 10 more audits I have to do every month. This doesn't, this is, it's exponential. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah. And I think, I think a good way to do that is you break down by process. Like maybe if you did 10 corrective actions, maybe six of them were related to, ⁓ one process. Right. So you have a process audit. It's not that you're auditing 10. You don't have 10 audits. You're still auditing that process. It's just that you should be, your area of focus should be on those risks, right? And that's the whole point. Are we reducing risk as low as reasonably practicable, right? And to various standards that we have set in place, but we have a standard that we have, okay, this is acceptable risk, you know? And have we mitigated that or manage, are we managing that? That doesn't, I mean, that's pretty, I don't want to say it's easy. But that's a simplified way of looking at it versus, and in getting away from this fear of holy crap, like scope creep, like you just said, I've had how many improvement efforts? Well, one, if you had that many corrective actions to improve a process, I would say that's good feedback to go back to whatever team or however we set up jobs or design the work. we, are we learning? as we go, how to design safer processes. ⁓ Because you should, as we learn, and we do the rework, all the corrective actions, that feedback loop has to go back to that team, whether you have an engineering team or a ⁓ industrial design team that say, hey, this is what we learned. You design this process, launched it, 12 months later, we had these incidents and issues we've corrected for them. This should be the standard for similar design similar like if we're going to launch a new site or do like that sort of that iteration should should be taking place. You should see that trend line go down instead of up with incidents. Right. Does that make sense. mean we're talking about it and it's perfect but that's what's missing sometimes. Alex: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. Yeah, it's, it's well, you know, we, typically talk about generic cause related to this, which is, know, I might find a specific problem with a specific incident or the specific piece of equipment. Well, I've got similar types around. have similar processes and it's oftentimes worth going and saying, Hey, let's look at a broader scope on this. I've got a labeling problem here. Do I have a labeling problem everywhere? You know, how, how big of a problem really is this? Blaine J. Hoffmann: Why? Alex: Yeah, it caused it here, but I probably got 20 other pieces of equipment that are similar. Let's go look at those as well. And so it's definitely an in scope for investigations. likewise with metrics, we want to think about, okay, I'm doing this inspection now. Maybe it's maybe I'm recording that information. it how what am going to do with it? Is this actually valuable? And ⁓ If I, is it worth inspecting it everywhere or just here? Is this something I need to be doing for the next six months or the next year or forever? All those kinds of things have to come into play when it comes to thinking about how do I make sure that this corrective action lasts? One of the scariest things that you can do is go look at corrective actions you put in place five years ago. That's one like I almost don't recommend doing it. You don't But I remember I remember this we had a tool we had a brass we purchased a special brass ⁓ pry bar is basically giant brass screwdriver and they used it for installation of Giant rollers big old rollers and they didn't want it to scrape the metal so they had to have a special Yeah, so you couldn't use rubber because the rubber just wore those coatings just wore off and so we had to purchase a special metal one Blaine J. Hoffmann: they need the soft metal yeah Alex: And like, remember, I mean, this was pretty early when I was in that plant. It was about five years later. And I was like, where is that? Hey, I was just doing an audit. I was like, hey, where's that special part that he had? And he goes, I don't know where it is. I think it's over there. We had to go hunt for an hour to find it. It's legit. And even in a place that, know, the same people were doing that job, it wasn't like, you know, a new person had come in and forgotten about it. Blaine J. Hoffmann: That five year regression is real, man. ⁓ wow. These are the same people. Alex: It was like the same person. So it's that kind of thing of like even, you know, it just got misplaced one day and they had to keep doing their work and that kind of stuff can occur. And so that's just one of those things. creating that culture, ideally in the culture, you would have wanted them to say, hey, I can't find this. And have brought it up and somebody had found it. But again, was somebody was just trying to do their job that day. and I'll find it later and find it later never came. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah. Never underestimate the will of somebody wanting to do their job. You know what I mean? They'll, they'll figure out a way to do it. And then look, there, you're probably your best. I've said this a lot of times, especially when somebody gets injured and you, and they, they cut a corner, quote unquote, cut a corner or they had to adapt right to get the job done. Those are usually your, your better workers. Those are usually your workers that are either. have no trouble producing or usually have a tendency to want to overproduce one of the eight wastes oddly enough. But they think if I do more, I'm good. I'm better, right? I can do more. But those are usually your better workers. And so that kind of fits with, I don't know if you call it risk taking, but like you said, I need this tool. I misplaced it. Alex: That's the worst of it. Blaine J. Hoffmann: I got to get this done. don't want to stop and talk to five people. I'll just use this. And then now that becomes the new normal for them. So crazy. Alex: Yeah, so I think we proved it. All metrics are lies and ⁓ we don't need leading indicators. I think we proved it. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Now, you know that's what somebody's going to clip that and they're just going to go with it. ⁓ Look, even in our discussion, we wanted to talk about metrics and we kept going back to the work. We kept getting pulled back because that's where we focused. Alex: Hey. I mean, that's the both part is getting leadership onto the floor, getting people onto the floor because that's, you know, I can look at graphs all day, but actually getting your hands involved makes more, makes a bigger difference than anything else. Blaine J. Hoffmann: So here, as we try to wrap this up, what would you recommend? Maybe you've been in this situation, especially in your capacity at Taproot, uh, consulting with customers. If a business manager or leader says, whatever, that's, I don't know. I don't, I can't get into the weeds. I'm an approving authority and I have to maintain this 30,000 foot view. Totally get it. I'm totally, I totally understand. Therefore, I want to know how many recordables we've taken, but I want to know like what we talked about earlier. I want to know when they became recordable. If I want, I can figure out the date that it happened, but I want to know how many recordable injuries were taken week over week. I need to see that metric because I have too many sites to look at. I've got to make business decisions to allocate resources. And we're like, okay, well, that's easily manipulated and it doesn't really get us what we should be focused on when we're injuring, not when we write it on some log the government wants us to fill out. Alex: Now, ⁓ so I would almost always challenge a metric just to say, are you using this metric in what ways are you using this metric? So that's first, what ways are you using this metric? That's a good way to determine if it's valuable or not. What I would say in that case of I can't get out to 35 facilities every whatever period. ⁓ Then as a manager, your responsibility is to make sure that there is someone in that management system process that is doing the inspections at each of those sites for whatever that metric is, for whatever the performance side of that metric is. Those would be probably the two things of advice, whether it's what decisions do you make based on this? If it's just, I want to know it. Okay, that's probably if that's not driving your decision making, it's probably not valuable that they're wasting their time making these graphs for you. The other thing would be. Well, I'm holding them accountable with it. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Well, yeah, that's what it is. Alex: That's oftentimes what a measure is for, is to hold people accountable. Yeah, therefore, but there's a value in holding people accountable to it. So I remember our hourly, we had an hourly target we had to hit, and each day at the end of the ship, they reported out if they hit it or not, and when they didn't, what happened. And so, Blaine J. Hoffmann: Therefore, it gets massaged. Alex: That process can be extremely valuable, but it also can be a dog and pony show. And it's up to the leader to make it valuable. So if you're going to do those accountability things, how do you actually make it make an impact? And how does it drive their behavior and decisions? And you've got to analyze that. And that's your responsibility as a leader is to analyze the impacts of the metrics that you're tracking. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yes. Alex: And, and I say that the intentional and unintentional. So the intentional is metric go up, but the unintentional is what are the incentive behaviors? You know, I think we had the podcast on soon, certain positives at some point. ⁓ but that, that, ⁓ you've got to look at those soon, certain positives. How is it influencing behavior? and. You're the ideal world is it influences behavior in a positive way. And that's what we want with metrics as they influence behavior in a positive way. So. And at the end of the day, I got a lot. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah, I think that's a good metric to look at is dog and pony shows. I mean, most folks, the motivation behind that is a some form of fear. One, I don't want to look bad. I don't want to get in trouble. I've got to put on a positive show of this or explanation of this. And then as soon as we're off the call, it's, hey, everybody, we got to get this. We got to get this figured out. We got to get this done. ⁓ And I think that's one of, I don't think, I know that is one of Deming's 14 leadership principles, drive out fear, I think is what it is. Yeah, drive out fear. ⁓ To make it like, yeah, you have to hold people accountable at some point. I mean, you know who those workers are or those leaders are or managers are, ⁓ but in general, and I worked, ⁓ for a company that did this very well. I was so impressed at how they did this, the culture they developed. It was a lean culture, but I cannot recall a time where any plant manager had to present a quote unquote failure that occurred and they tried to paint over it or gloss over it. They owned it. They would also, they fell on the sword. They never passed a buck to a lower level area manager or anything. Alex: You need some good plant managers. I can't say I've seen some massage data before. I've seen some sketch presentations that I was not quite before. Blaine J. Hoffmann: no, I have. Yeah. In other companies, this one, this one manufacturing company, they, they consistently had, ⁓ had ingrained in them this, like, this is, this is why we, this is why we report out. This is that what's at risk. If we don't report out properly, we can't have that. ⁓ they made, they made aircraft engine components and parts. so they kind of knew. ⁓ they owned it. I w I've told the story, ⁓ a bunch of times about, ⁓ we would have a well, a welder welding on a part would, ⁓ the area manager would say, Hey, I've got to report our numbers out. Like we've got these, these two parts are taking longer than, know, they, they, of course they have a average time it takes to fabricate or put together a component. Right. And the welder would be at the, the area meeting and then they would have. Then the area manager would go to the plant meeting and then that's how it cascaded up The welder would say there's no way I'm not happy with that weld. I had I really had trouble getting under Under there for that. Well, I I don't want it because they knew it one it would quality control would catch it and they would reject it and that would look poorly on them or And this is what the welder said I was in the meeting when he said this he goes he wasn't concerned about that He said if quality control misses it It's on a plane and that area manager said, all right, I can speak to that. And that was all he said. And so then I go to the plant meeting and he sure as heck said that, ⁓ we're not going to, if we're not a hundred percent certain, ⁓ we're not going to push, push apart through. So we've got two parts that are going to be late. ⁓ but they're, ⁓ they're top priority. We're working on those first. And he owned it. He didn't throw the welder under the bus. He said, like, and so they were very consistent about that. But, but to your point, the, the years and years it takes to develop that culture and to, and to maintain it is, was impressive. Alex: Yeah. Well, and, and, you know, I, I've, if aerospace is definitely good with that because there's liability in it too. I remember you know, your clock number and that ties to you and it's on a plane and somebody dies. They know it was your clock number. So there's definitely, there's a, there's a huge level of accountability in that. So I, I, Blaine J. Hoffmann: Because of the risk, yeah. It's kind of baked into the cake. Right. Yeah. Toy and Toyota. We did mention this. We talked about book managers. ⁓ You mentioned you've known a few they'll they'll read a book and go. We gotta do this. You can read the Toyota way. But Toyota has been at it for I mean and the cultural differences and the culture development and the lessons they learned. You can't just distill that into a book and give it to somebody and then they're doing it. It's. crazy to think that you're going to pull that off. Alex: Yeah, there's a whole prof that you go through for implementation of anything new, metrics or processes for reporting them out. I like the four quadrangle, there's a valley of depression anytime you do them. So there's the resistance at the beginning that everybody's sad about it, and finally there's kind of reluctant compliance and then they make it there finally. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah. And then you get those laggards at the end. Yeah, these it's the adoption curve, right? There's this there's a rut at the beginning. Alex: Well, there's the adoption, but it's the inverse for the adoption of true, yeah. Well, I think it's with whatever you do there, and I can't remember the exact what they call it, it was four quadrant, which was at first, you're introducing something new, everybody gets pissed off that it's new, and everybody's mad about it. And then they just, they complaining and kind of, it sucks. So they're in the valley of depression. And then they start to see value and they start to understand and get used to it. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yes. Alex: And finally you get to whatever that, that next level is because now they understand it and it's changed what they gotten used to it. The culture is adapted. And so. Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yeah. And I don't know Alex that our culture today of instant gratification. And I mean, we've been almost an hour on this podcast and people were like, Nope, that's too long. So they'll probably watch all the shorts that we clip out of this and they'll eventually get the whole episode by streaming all the shorts. So if we break up a one hour episode into 40 second, ⁓ clips, they'll get the whole thing eventually, but Alex: You got a whole three minutes on YouTube. Blaine J. Hoffmann: This is true. ⁓ right, man, metrics, metrics are, man, I'm still. Alex: How did we talk an hour about metrics? Blaine J. Hoffmann: We could go even longer, I know, but Metrix, loved your question. What are we, what ways are we using these? Like, what's this doing for me at all? And I love that one. Yeah. All right, man. Hey, tell everyone where they can find you and ⁓ everything about Taproot. We ⁓ gotta get that in there. Alex: What's it doing for me and what's it doing for them? Pleasure's all. Blaine J. Hoffmann: I love the work you guys do. Alex: Everything about average average calm you can find it there or if you're finding this on blaines YouTube come check out our YouTube channel as well We've got lots of ⁓ fun little episodes over there, too. So pleasure is all Blaine J. Hoffmann: Yes. Yeah, absolutely. Maybe, maybe we do a collaboration. We do a, I'll have to come down to Knoxville though. Knoxville and ⁓ hang out in your studio. ⁓ All right. Sounds good. Thanks once again, Alex, for taking time out of your busy schedule Alex: That's for ya.